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As computer technology advances and the price of computers declines,
these powerful machines become more commonplace in homes and offic-
es.' Computers assume an expanded role in people's lives, and individuals
become more dependent on computers to perform diverse functions.' As
this dependency increases, so does the potential for harm from computer
abuse. Regrettably, legislation to control such abuse lags behind the
increasing incidence of computer crime
Additional federal legislation is needed to contain the growth of
"computer virus" crime. An insidious category of crime ranging between
vandalism and terrorism, computer virus crime involves computer pro-
grammers intentionally destroying the host computer or its data with their
programs.4 All states except Vermont have existing statutes to prohibit
various computer crimes, some of which extend to computer viruses.5
However, computer communication and user information needs are not
restricted by state lines. Many computers communicate with other comput-
ers through networks that span the entire nation and often extend into for-
eign countries. It is estimated that one in every four personal computers
has a modem which allows users to communicate with each other over
telephone lines.6 This capacity for widespread communication mandates
federal legislation to prevent computer crime.
This article will identify the various types of rogue computer programs
commonly called viruses, analyze the current federal statutes regarding
computer crime and review proposed statutes designed to prevent comput-
er virus crime.
Anne W. Branscomb, Rogue Computer Programs And Computer Rogues: Tailoring The
Punishment To Fit The Crime, 16 RurGRs COMPurFE & TIECH. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1990).
2 Id. at 2.
3 Id.
4 Daniel J. Kluth, The Computer Virus Threat: A Survey Of Current Criminal Statutes, 13
HAMLINE L. REV. 297, 298 (1990).
s Branscomb, supra note 1, at 30.
6 Id. at 2.
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H. ROGUE PROGRAMS
Rogue programs are a class of computer programs which harm or dis-
rupt a computer system.7 Like other computer programs, they are not in-
herently malicious! All programs consist of a series of instructions for the
computer to execute. 9 Accordingly, a computer programmer must specifi-
cally design the rogue program to produce harm.' °
A. Evolution of Rogue Programs
From the creation of the first computers until 1983, rogue programs
were merely theories or experiments by the scientific community." To
apply these theories, experimental games were played out at several com-
puter research centers, such as AT&T's Bell Laboratories and Xerox Cor-
poration research center in Palo Alto, California. 2
The experimental games evolved into "Core Wars," where scientists
would match wits by creating a program designed to replicate itself and
consume their opponent's program in a computer's core memory. The
self-replicating programs were called "organisms" because of their ability
to grow without direction from their creator. 3 The "Core War" battles
were waged in controlled environments. Nocturnal battles raged in large,
isolated mainframe computers, so the organism program usually did not
have the opportunity to affect other computers or programs. 4 The secrets
concerning these organism programs became public knowledge in 1983
The public and the media commonly use the term "computer virus" to describe any harmful
or destructive computer program. See Raymond L. Hansen, The Computer Circus Eradication Act of
1989: The War Against Computer Crime Continues, 3 SOFTWARE L.J. 717, 721 n. 15 (1990). In this
paper, the term "rogue program" will be used to describe this class. "Malicious code" is another term
for the class of programs intended to cause damage. See PHIp Frr u AL.., The Computer Virus
Crisis 7 (2nd Ed. 1992).
8 Hansen, supra note 7, at 721.
9 FVES, supra note 7, at 40.
10 A "hacker" is a computer programmer who designs programs or series of instructions to
perform disruptive tasks. The term "hacker" previously indicated a talented computer programmer or
operator, but presently describes a computer criminal. FrrEs, supra note 7, at 95.
1 For a brief history of the development of computer viruses, see JOHN MCAFEE & COLIN
HAYNES, COMPUTER VIRuSES, WoRMs, DATA DIDLERS, KILLER PROGRAMS, AND OTHER THREATS TO
YOUR SYSTEM 23-25 (1989).




when Ken Thompson, the originator of the UNIX operating system, de-
scribed early virus programs and "Core War" activities in a speech to a
computer association." Following Thompson's speech, Scientific Ameri-
can published an article regarding the early virus programs, and even
offered to send readers additional technical details on how to create com-
puter viruses. 6
After the days of "Core Wars," several major types of rogue computer
programs developed: viruses, worms, bombs, trojan horses, and trap doors.
They all perform malicious functions but operate in varying ways.
B. Viruses
Computer virus programs earned their name from an analogy to medi-
cal viruses, which are also extremely small, hard to locate, spread disease
by attaching to other cells, and multiply while devastating the infected
organism. 7 Similar to the original "Core Wars" organism, a computer vi-
rus program is a series of instructions that infects other computer pro-
grams by amending the original computer program with its own instruc-
tions.' Computer viruses cannot operate in isolation without a host com-
puter system to execute their instructions.
These viruses possess the capability to attach to other programs, repli-
cate, and damage the host system. To spread, the virus program constantly
seeks to infect new host computers and programs. If a non-infected
computer disk is inserted into a virus infected computer, the virus attempts
to spread its infection by checking the disk for existing copies of itself. If
the disk does not already have a copy of the virus, the virus will clone
itself by copying its own instructions on the new disk.' When the newly
infected disk is inserted in a different computer, the virus repeats this
replication process and continues to spread. This constant spreading pro-
cess is often referred to as the replication phase.2' Computer viruses are
i Id. at 26; See also Frras. supra note 7, at 21.
16 McAff, supra note 11, at 26; See also Fris, supra note 7, at 21.
17 FrrES, supra note 7, at 28.
18 MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 1.
19 Id.
20 l d.
21 James Tramontana, Computer Viruses: Is There A Legal "Antibiotic?", 16 RUtGERS CaM-
PnER & TECH. U. 253, 255 (1990).
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difficult to detect because of the sophisticated methods the viruses use to
attach and disguise themselves.'
1. CATEGORIES OF VIRUS PROGRAMS
To identify and describe computer virus programs, computer program-
mers and users classify them into categories. One simple method of cate-
gorizing virus programs, consistent with the medical virus analogy, de-
notes computer viruses as either "benign" or "malignant."' Benign virus-
es do not intend to damage the host computer or its data, but are usually
created as pranks to disrupt users by displaying a silly message or image
on the screen.' Benign viruses can, however, cause considerable harm to
the users by consuming valuable computer resources.' A malignant virus
intends to harm the host computer system by altering, changing, or de-
stroying programs and data.'
Another method of categorizing virus programs is by type of resulting
disruption. Virus programs can be divided into four classes of disruption:
innocuous, humorous, altering, and catastrophic. An innocuous virus is
harmless to the computer system, and creates no noticeable disruptions for
the user because the virus resides in the computer without conflicting with
existing systems or application programs." A humorous virus program
usually only displays a message or image on the user's screen as a joke or
prank. It does not modify or delete any data in the computer system, but
can sometimes erase itself and disappear.' Innocuous and humorous
types of viruses may be considered benign because the host system is not
damaged or deleted.
Altering and catastrophic viruses, however, are malignant. Altering
viruses modify data within the system. 9 This dangerous type of virus
changes information in spreadsheets, word processing documents and data
bases without alerting the user of the subtle alterations. For example, an
altering virus might change a spreadsheet or database by transposing num-
Id.




27 McAFEF, supra note 1, at 60-61.
28 Id. at 61.
29 Id.
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bers or moving the decimal place to alter the information.30 The cata-
strophic viruses are the worst, because they can destroy critical system
files. A catastrophic virus could erase all the information in a computer
system, preventing the system from operating normally.3
The Computer Virus Industry Association (CVIA) also categorizes
computer virus programs by identifying the location of the computer sys-
tem that the virus infects.32 Programs are divided into three classes by in-
fected areas: boot segment, operating system, and general applications.33
First, boot segment viruses infect the area of a computer disk, either flop-
py or fixed, which contains programs that execute start-up procedures of
the computer system, such as installing the operating system and preparing
the system for operation.' The boot segment programs are critical to the
normal operation of a computer system because they are the primary in-
structions executed when a computer is activated.35 If a virus infects the
boot sector, it has total control of the system from the first moment that it
is turned on because the virus executes itself when other boot sector pro-
grams are executed.36
Second, operating system viruses infect the programs that manage the
resources for the entire computer system. For example, the computer's op-
erating system controls all inputs and outputs, and execution of application
programs.37 An operating system virus is detrimental because the virus
program would have control of the computer system's resources and could
cause severe problems by changing the manner that system resources are
allocated.3"
Third, application viruses infect general application programs that per-
form functions for the user such as word processing or spreadsheets.39 An
application virus is the most difficult to detect because the virus can copy
itself into any general application program in a computer system. It can
hide in word processing programs, spreadsheet programs, communication
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Hansen, supra note 7, at 723.
S33 MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 61.
34 Id.
3 I d. at 68.
36 Id. at 69.
37 Id. at 63.
3 Id. at 70-71.
Id. at 63.
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programs, game programs, or any of the countless other office automation
programs.' Application viruses can also infect programs designed to de-
tect and destroy computer viruses.4
2. EXAMPLE OF A VIRUS:
PAKISTANI BRAIN VIRUS
An excellent example of a computer virus program is the "Pakistani
Brain" virus. This highly infectious computer virus has infected the boot
segments of IBM personal computers (PCs) and compatible systems
around the world since 1986.42 This computer virus originated in illegal
copies of software purchased from the Brain Computer Services store in
Lahore, Pakistan. The virus spread on pirated copies of the software
around the world, especially to the United States where personal comput-
ers are more prevalent.43
The Pakistani Brain virus is infectious and difficult to detect because
of its elegant design and elaborate self-protection techniques which enable
it to remain hidden." The Brain rapidly infects any DOS-formatted flop-
py disk that it comes in contact with and continues to spread from disk to
disk.45 After the Brain virus activates, it erases all information and pro-
grams from the disk, and can also display the message:
WELCOME TO THE DUNGEON
c 1986 Basit & Amjad (pvt) Ltd.
BRAIN COMPUTER SERVICES
730 Nizam Block
40 Id. at 71.
41 Id.
42 McAFEE, supra note 11, at 92; See also Hansen, supra note 7, at 724.
43 Two brothers, Amjad Farooq Alvi and Basit Farooq Alvi, created the virus as an anti-piracy
warning and revenge after some of their own software was pirated. They then sold illegally copied
software, such as Lotus 1-2-3 and Wordstar,and placed their virus on these pirated disks which sold to
tourists for less than one percent of the cost of the originals. Id. at 92-93. See also Hansen, supra note
7, at 723 n. 25. The virus was easily traced to the two brothers in Pakistan because they placed their
names, address, and phone number in the computer instructions and on the displayed message when
the virus activates. In addition, Amjad admitted creating the virus by being quoted as saying "Because
you are pirating,. . . you must be punished." Branscomb, supra note 1, at 15.
Hansen, supra note 7, at 723; See also Branscomb, supra note 1, at 16.




Phone: 430791, 443248, 2800530
Beware Of This VIRUS
Contact Us For Vaccination'
Even after infecting an estimated 200,000 computers by 1988, the
Pakistani Brain virus created a positive side effect. In 1988, when the
Brain was at its peak of infections and publicity, proprietary software sales
increased dramatically.47 Computer users felt that it was better to pay the
price for safe proprietary software than become infected with a virus simi-
lar to the Pakistani Brain.48
C. Worm
A worm program is a rogue computer program with the capability of
moving through a computer network or bulletin board service by wiggling
from computer to computer.49 A worm moves through a system or a net-
work of systems altering small bits of data or code whenever it can get
access.' For example, a worm can be instructed to infiltrate bank com-
puter systems, transfer funds to an illicit account, and then erase itself so
the worm is never discovered." It is called a worm because it leaves a
trail of altered data in the form of zeroes which resembles a worm
track.
5 2
Unlike virus programs, worm programs do not contain instructions to
replicate itself into other programs. 3 If a worm program were to work
through a system and attach itself to another program by duplicating itself,
Id.; Branscomb, supra note 1 at 15. One frustrated victim of the Brain virus was Froma
Joselow, a financial reporter for the Providence Journal newspaper in Rhode Island. She lost over six
months of work after she became trapped in the Pakistani Brain's electronic dungeon and it destroyed
her notes and drafts of a future article. Id. at 14-15. The Brain not only infected Froma's computer,
but also infected over 300 computers of an electronic editing system of the Providence Journal.
MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 94.
McAFEE, supra note 11, at 92-93.
Id.
Hansen, supra note 7, at 721 n. 18.
so FTEs, supra note 7, at 7.
s MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 75.
52 Frr s, supra note 7, at 7.
s3 MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 75.
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it would then be considered a virus because of its capability to self-repli-
cate.'
Some worm programs perform constructive functions."5 For example,
authorized programmers may execute a worm program to move through a
network of computers in search of potential resources for processing tasks
that require an inordinate amount of computer time.'
1. EXAMPLES OF WORMS
INTERNET/ARPANET WORM
A famous example of a worm program is the InterNet/Arpanet worm.
Robert T. Morris Jr., a 23 year old first-year graduate student in Cornell
University's doctoral program in computer science, created and inserted a
worm program into the linked InterNet/Arpanet networks. 7 The InterNet
and Arpanet networks consist of 1,200 individual networks with a total of
85,000 computers linked together for exchanging scientific information be-
tween academic institutions.58 The U.S. Department of Defense also uses
these networks to communicate with researchers concerning technology for
potential defense applications.5"
Morris designed and created the InterNet worm program to spread
from one computer across a national network of computers, bypassing all
security procedures.' He released the worm program to demonstrate the
inadequacies of current security measures on computer networks by ex-
ploiting the security defects.6 Because it occupied minimal amounts of
computer time, and did not interfere with the computer's normal opera-
tions, Morris expected that the worm would not draw attention.62
On November 2, 1988, Morris inserted the worm program in the
InterNet network through a computer at the Massachusetts Institute of
54 FrS, supra note 7, at 7.
55 Kluth, supra note 4, at 300.
% Id.
57 United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1991); See also MCAFEE, supra note
12, at 5.
so McAEE, supra note 12, at 6.
Id. at 5.
60 Morris, 928 F.2d at 505; See also MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 81.
61 Morris, 928 F.2d at 505; See also Branscomb, supra note 1, at 7.
62 Morris, 928 F.2d at 505.
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Technology (MIT) to disguise the source of the worm program.63 As the
worm program rapidly gained access to computers linked in the network,
it consumed the memory capacity of each computer through a slight pro-
gramming error, by repeatedly replicating itself in the memory of each
computer it accessed.' Within hours, the virus ran rampant through indi-
vidual networks infecting over 6,200 computers forcing them to either
crash or become "catatonic."'65 System managers completely shut down
their computer systems because the worm had clogged the memories of
the computers to the point where the computers could not perform routine
functions.' The worm forced certain networks off the air for as long as
five days.67
The benign InterNet worm did not destroy hardware or data, but did
disrupt normal computer operations at military facilities, government agen-
cies, and universities." It cost over a million hours of direct labor hours
and eight million hours in indirect costs.6" To complicate matters, this
was the first virus of this magnitude and many programmers around the
country duplicated efforts by designing programs to disinfect their own
networks while other programmers worked on similar programs.7" The
total cost has been calculated at over 98 million dollars.7'
In 1990, a jury convicted Robert T. Morris of violating the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 by intentionally accessing a federal interest
computer, preventing authorized use of the computers, and causing more
63 Morris, 928 F.2d at 506.
6 Id. See also MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 81.
65 MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 81; See also FrrEs, supra note 7, at 26.
6 MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 81.
67 Id. at 6.
6 Kluth, supra note 4, at 301. Victims of the InterNet/Arpanet worm included important re-
search facilities such as Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, NASA's Ames Research Center, the Naval
Ocean Systems Command, the Super Computer Center in San Diego and the Rand Corporation. It also
affected many academic institutions such as MIT, the California institute of Technology, Stanford,
Berkeley, Boston, Purdue, Wisconsin, Harvard, Minnesota, Cornell, and other universities. MCAFEE,
supra note 11. at 82.
6 The direct labor hours incurred recovering from the infection included programmers identi-
fying the virus, disinfecting the networks, and restoring the network to normal operation. The indirect
costs included the hours that computers could not link into the network for fear of reinfection and lost
access time, or hours that user were unable to access and use the information on the networks.
MCAFE, supra note II at 6.
70 Id. at 8.
1 Id at6.
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than $1,000 in damage. 2 "He was sentenced to three years of probation,
400 hours of community service, a fine of $10,050, and the costs of his
supervision.""
IBM CHRISTMAS CARD
The IBM Christmas card is a further example of a computer worm
program that caused disruption for thousands of computer users. A West
German law student innocently sent a graphic image of a Christmas tree to
friends through the European Academic Research Network (EARN), but
the worm program sent copies of itself including the graphic image of a
Christmas tree to all users in the electronic mail system.74 The worm es-
caped from EARN and crossed the Atlantic through communication satel-
lites to infect up to 350,000 IBM computers linked to their internal elec-
tronic mail system.75
The worm worked its way through the electronic mail networks so
quickly and sent so many images to users that IBM was forced to shut
down its internal mail system for three days to remove the worm, obvious-
ly disrupting the flow of information throughout IBM and thus reducing
IBM's productivity.76
D. Bomb
A bomb is a rogue computer program that has secret programming
instructions which enable it to perform harmful acts at predetermined
times." There are two types of bombs: time bombs and logic bombs. A
time bomb performs its disruptive act on a specified date or time.7" In-
stead of executing on a specified date or time, a logic bomb executes
when a predetermined event occurs.79 Hackers often instruct their virus
programs to operate as bombs, triggered either by time or by logic.'
72 Morris, 928 F.2d at 506.
73 Id.
74 MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 99.
75 McAFEE, supra note 11, at 30. See also FITES, supra note 7, at 23.
76 McAFEE, supra note 11, at 100.
Hansen, supra note 7, at 723.




When a virus program has been instructed to perform a time or logic
bomb, it possesses the capability to replicate and spread, and also to attack
users with sudden damage."
1. EXAMPLES OF TIME BOMBS
ISRAEL OR FRIDAY THE 13TH VIRUS
The "Friday the 13th" virus program was designed as a weapon of
terrorism to infect IBM and compatible personal computers in Israel. 2
This highly infectious virus could replicate into both operating systems
and general application programs. It was set to erase all the files within
infected computer systems on Friday, May 13, 1988, which was the 40th
anniversary of the day Israel became a state.83 Before the virus could
execute on May 13th, the computer staff of Hebrew University discovered
the virus through a programming error and avoided the potential disaster
by developing programs to identify and disinfect computers that contained
the hidden virus." The Friday the 13th virus, as others, continues to be
unknowingly distributed and can activate on future occurrences of Friday
the 13th.
MACMAG VIRUS
The MacMag or Aldus Peace virus activated on March 2, 1988, the
first anniversary of the Mac H introduction, by displaying a universal
peace message on Macintosh computers all over the world.' The editor
of MacMag, Richard Brandow, intentionally infected a publicly used
Macintosh personal computer with the virus during a two day conference
of Macintosh users.' Brandow infected the computer, so it would spread
a warning message to users concerning the dangers of software piracy. 7
81 Id.
82 MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 97; See also FrrEs, supra note 7, at 33.
93 McAFEE, supra note 11, at 97; See also FrrS, supra note 7, at 33.
8 MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 97.
as Id. at 31. See also FrrEs, supra note 7, at 32.
86 Branscomb, supra note 1, at 13.
McAFEE, supra note 11, at 102.
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When the virus activated on its specified date, March 2, 1988, it displayed
the message:
RICHARD BRANDOW, publisher of MacMag, and its entire staff
would like to take this opportunity to convey their
UNIVERSAL MESSAGE OF PEACE
to all Macintosh users around the world
The benign virus displayed the message and an image of a globe before it
erased itself without damaging any programs or data."
The virus spread rapidly from users at the conference through bulletin
boards and users swapping disks.9 A consultant to Aldus, a large soft-
ware publishing house, unwittingly infected his own computer with the
virus and then sent an infected disk to Aldus.'
The MacMag virus was the first virus program that was unknowingly
distributed through proprietary software." It replicated into commercial
copies of the Aldus Freehand software, a graphical drawing and painting
program.92 After infecting over 350,000 Macintosh users, the MacMag
virus received vast publicity and intangibly affected Aldus' reputation in
the software market.93
Later, another virus almost made its way into an updated version of
the same program, but Aldus detected the virus and contained it before it
was distributed in commercial copies of the software.'
MICHELANGELO
Michelangelo, a recent virus program, infects the boot sector of com-
puter systems and activates every year on March 6, the birthday of the Re-
naissance painter and sculptor, by erasing any infected computer's hard
disk.9" Michelangelo furthered the awareness of computer users to protec-
88 FrrEs, supra note 7, at 3. See also MCAFEE, supra note 12, at 102.
9 FirEs, supra note 7, at 24.
90 MCAFEE, supra note 12, at 102.
I9 d. at 31.
Id. at 31.
93 Branscomb, supra note 1, at 13; See also Kuth, supra note 4, at 302.
MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 31.
95 James Daly, Michelangelo Virus: Security A Tough Sell, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 22, 1993,
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tion and security through widespread publicity before the virus could at-
tack in 1992.96
2. EXAMPLES OF LOGIC BOMBS
SCORES VIRUS
The Scores virus illustrates how a computer virus program could tar-
get an individual entity, such as a company.' An ex-employee of Elec-
tronic Data Systems (EDS), a leading computer consulting and data pro-
cessing company, created Scores to destroy EDS proprietary programs and
data on Macintosh computers."s Scores infects general applications pro-
grams and activates whenever it identifies a file as EDS proprietary infor-
mation.99 After activation, it erases all EDS information."°°
Since that original Scores virus, other hackers modified the virus to
seek and destroy all files, not only EDS files. The modified Scores infect-
ed Macintosh computers at NASA, Congressional offices, Boeing Aircraft
Company, Ford Aerospace, other government agencies, and thousands of
other systems.'0 '
LEHIGH VIRUS
The Lehigh virus received its name from Lehigh University where it
began infecting a large number of personal computers used by students in
1987. 0 Lehigh spreads by infecting the boot segment of computer disks
as they are inserted into infected computers. 3 After it replicates four
times, it activates and destroys all the files on the computer's hard
disk."
96 Id.
97 MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 103.
9 Id.
9 Hansen, supra note 7, at 725.
1W Id.
101 MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 31.
102 Id. at 98.
103 Hansen, supra note 7, at 724.
104 MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 98.
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E. Trojan Horse
A Trojan horse is an innocent program that conceals a destructive pro-
gram such as a virus, worm, or bomb."° Trojan horses are a common
way for rogue programs to spread from computer to computer."
Hackers often use Trojan horses to seduce users into unknowingly
spreading their rogue programs. They often use attractive programs such
as games, graphics programs, or pornographic games as Trojan horses
which carry the hidden rogue programs. 7 Hackers commonly distribute
Trojan horses freely through bulletin board services to spread rapidly."5
For example, a deceptive hacker may load a chess game program with a
concealed virus on a small bulletin board service so whenever a user
downloads the free chess game or exchanges the game with another user,
the virus spreads.
F. Trap Door
A trap door is an easily accessible method for a user to gain access to
a computer system." When a user enters the specified combination of
keys, the system allows the user access to files even though the user did
not satisfy the normal security procedures."' If hackers discover a trap
door in a computer system, they can insert rogue programs in that system
without the required security authorization."'
Programmers usually create trap doors for legitimate purposes. Pro-
grammers utilize trap doors as a convenient method of accessing the sys-
tem to construct, test, and maintain programs, while not affecting any us-
ers operating in the system."2 During construction of the system, pro-
05 Id. at 76.
10 FrrEs, supra note 7. at 8. The Trojan horse computer program received its name from the
large, wooden horse where Greek warriors hid within to gain entry to the besieged city of Troy. Kluth,
supra note 4, at 298. When the Greeks placed the wooden horse statue outside the gates of Troy, the
Trojans assumed the statue was a peace offering and brought the horse into their city. Once inside, the
Greek warriors opened the gate to the waiting Greek army and the city of Troy fell. MCAFEE, supra
note 11, at 76.
107 MCAFEE, supra note 11, at 76.
l0 Id.
10 FrlM, supra note 7, at 371.
110 Id.
III MCAFEE, supra note 12, at 78.
112 Id.
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grammers create trap doors for convenient access to the system. However,
after completion, the trap door is often forgotten and never removed. A
trap door is a weak link that can be exploited by a hacker if discovered.
M. FEDERAL PROTECTION
A. Evolution of Computer Crime Legislation
As the number of computers increased, criminal acts where a comput-
er was either the object, the subject, or the instrument of the crime also
increased."3 Prior to 1984, federal prosecutors attempted to apply com-
mon law principles to computer crimes." 4 Without concise legislation
that defined computer terminology, courts were forced to create analogies
between twentieth century computer concepts and traditional common law
principles, some dating back to English law."5
Common law principles provided an inadequate basis for prosecuting
computer criminals because of the specific conduct involved in these
crimes."' The broad language and inappropriate terminology used in
these traditional statutes made prosecution unjustifiably difficult." 7 For
example, when prosecuting theft of computer property, the concept of a
taking could not address unauthorized access to confidential computer
material because no legal precedent existed to determine whether computer
information was "property.""' Further, traditional criminal statutes only
applied to computer crime when abusive computer conduct was committed
in connection with a traditional crime."9 Common law principles and
traditional criminal statutes did not specifically address computer crime
conduct, especially computer virus crime. 2°
In 1984, Congress enacted the first federal computer crime statute, the
Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.' Both
13 Danyl C. Wilson, Viewing Computer Crime: Where Does The Systems Error Really Exist?,
11 Computer/L.J. 265, 267 (1991).
" Id. at 267.
11 Hansen, supra note 7. at 727.
116 Tramontana, supra note 21, at 263.
117 Hansen, supra note 7, at 727.
I Wilson, supra note 113, at 268.
"9 Tramontana, supra note 21, at 264.
120 Id.
121 Hansen, supra note 7, at 730.
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the general public and the federal bureaucracy, the largest consumer of
computer products and services in the United States, had urged Congress
to adopt computer crime legislation for greater protection of computer sys-
tems.'" Congress created the new law to address the unique circum-
stances and applications of this new form of crime."2 This computer
crime statute had several flaws because it lacked clear definitions of appli-
cable computer terms, clear jurisdictional statements, and incentives for
computer crime victims to report the abuse. 24 It was amended two years
later."z
Currently, there are three components to federal protection against
computer crime: the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA), the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), and the Com-
puter Security Act of 1987 (CSA). 26 The CFAA is the federal
government's "big stick" to wave at potential hackers. The other two acts
can be applicable in limited circumstances, but the CFAA is the only
weapon in the federal government's limited arsenal.
B. Computer Fraue and Abuse Act of 1986
After enacting their first computer crime statute in 1984 and discover-
ing the flaws in it, Congress quickly amended the Counterfeit Access De-
vice and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act with the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1986).27 CFAA consists of six primary subsections to pro-
hibit the following conduct:
1) knowing unauthorized access to obtain information that is re-
stricted for national security by Executive Order;'
2) intentional unauthorized access to information from a financial
institution or consumer reporting agency; 29
' Id. at 728.
12 Id. at 727.
124 Id. at 729.
125 Id.
12 Wilson, supra note 113, at 271.
'27 Hansen, supra note 7, at 731.
12" 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(1) (1990).
12 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(2) (1990).
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3) intentional unauthorized access that interferes with government
operation of government computers; 13°
4) knowing unauthorized access to a government computer with
the intent to defraud and results in obtaining anything of value
other than the use of the computer;
3
1
5) intentional unauthorized access to a federal interest computer
that results in alteration, damage, or destruction of information in
the computer or prevents authorized use of the computer or infor-
mation; 32 and
6) knowingly trafficking passwords or similar information with
the intent to defraud and the trafficking affects interstate or for-
eign commerce, or a federal interest computer.
33
Two of the six subsections of the CFAA apply to computer virus
crime. First, subsection §1030(a)(3) prohibits intentional unauthorized ac-
cess that interferes with the federal government's use of a government
computer." This subsection applies to a computer virus program, but
only if the virus affects the operations of a government computer. 35
Even with this restriction, the subsection still has some utility to federal
prosecutors because "the federal government is the largest consumer of
computer products and services in the United States."'" However, this
subsection neglects to protect many computer systems and networks in the
private sector.
37
Second, subsection §1030(a)(5) prohibits altering, damaging, or de-
stroying information, or preventing authorized use of a "federal interest
computer."''3  These are defined as computers used by or for the U.S.
government, or for a financial institution 31 or as one of two or more
computers linked in more than one state."4 By including the latter defi-
130 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(3) (1990).
131 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(4) (1990).
132 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5) (1990).
13 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(6) (1990).
134 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(3) (1990).
13s Tramontana, supra note 21, at 267.
136 Hansen, supra note 7, at 729.
137 Tramontana, supra note 21, at 267.
13 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5) (1990).
139 18 U.S.C. §1030(e)(2)(A) (1990).
140 18 U.S.C. §1030(e)(2)(B) (1990).
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nition, which addresses interstate computer crime, this subsection is sub-
stantially broader than the previous applicable subsection which prohibits
unauthorized interference with the federal government's use of comput-
ers. 141
Despite improving the statutory language of its predecessor, the CFAA
remains a flawed legislative response to the problem of computer
crime."' Undefined statutory terms cause parties in a dispute to argue
over what meaning should apply.43 Further, current case law does not
provide precedent to interpret the meanings of these statutory terms be-
cause the federal government has tried only a few cases under the
CFAA.'" Without defined terms or precedent, courts interpret legislative
intent to determine meanings for key terms in the statute. Thus, judges,
who are inexperienced with computer technology, must interpret the key
terms and apply them to the circumstances of the case at hand.'45
First, the CFAA fails to precisely define the term "access." The issue
is what conduct constitutes "access" and whether computer viruses satisfy
the meaning of access within the CFAA. The statute proscribes hackers
from intentionally accessing a federal interest computer without authoriza-
tion."4 However, many viruses infect computers without the hacker actu-
ally physically accessing the computer. " A virus program could access
the computer by replicating and spreading, or an individual unaware of the
virus could insert an infected disk in the computer. 4 The federal courts
have not decided the definitional issue of "access" because cases prosecut-
ed under the CFAA have involved virus infections where the hacker phys-
ically accessed the computer system.
Second, the "knowing" or "intentional" standard of culpability under
the CFAA provides an enormous obstacle for federal prosecutors to over-
come.'49 In the case of computer virus crime, the subjective intent or
mental state of the hacker is the most difficult aspect for the government
141 Id.
142 Hansen, supra note 7, at 732; See also Wilson, supra note 113, at 272..
143 Hansen, supra note 7, at 732.
I" Id. at 733.
45 dat 732.
146 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5) (1990).
147 Tramontana, supra note 21, at 269.
14' Id.
149 18 U.S.C. §1030(a) (1990).
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to prove.' The hackers last intentional act is the release of the virus.
After releasing the virus, the hacker has little or no control over who the
virus infects or what damage it will cause.' The hacker has reason to
know that infection would be likely because that is what the virus program
is designed to do, but the statute requires a direct intention to infect com-
puters. 12
Although the federal government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that a suspected hacker intended to access the federal interest com-
puter, it is not required to prove a hacker intended to damage the system
or prevent authorized use of the computer system. In United States v.
Morris, Robert Morris accessed a network of computers comprised of aca-
demic and government users, and inserted a worm program that uncontrol-
lably forced computers to shut down and prevented many authorized users
from utilizing the network.' As a defense, Morris claimed that he did
intend to access the computer, but he did not intend to prevent authorized
use of the computer." His worm program had a slight programming er-
ror that caused the worm to consume the memory capacity of computers
thereby preventing authorized use.'55 The appellate court interpreted the
statute to require the "intentional" standard for accessing the computer, but
not for damage or prevention of authorized use. 6
Third, the CFAA fails to provide an incentive for victims of a com-
puter virus to report the crime. Although the Act provides for offenders to
receive potentially substantial jail terms, the Act fails to provide financial
restitution or civil remedies.'" The private sector is hesitant to report
computer viruses or pursue civil remedies because victims try to avoid
publicity of a virus infection that would compromise the company's repu-
tation or reveal possible vulnerabilities.' Corporations, especially finan-
cial institutions, want their customers to feel that their information is se-
cure. 59 Another reason for not pursuing civil remedies is victims com-
ISO Hansen, supra note 7, at 734.
I"' I1
152 Tramontana, supra note 21 at 268.
15 Morris, 928 F.2d at 506.
14 Id. at 508-09.
15 Id. at 506.
156 Id. at 509.
137 Wilson, supra note 113, at 272; See also Hansen, supra note 7, at 732.
"' Hansen, supra note 7, at 732; See also FrrES, supra note 7, at 139.
In FIrES, supra note 7, at 139.
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monly do not recover much from the hacker."6° Without adequate incen-
tives for victims to report the virus crime, the federal government can not
effectively enforce the statute.
Fourth, the CFAA lacks broad interstate jurisdiction for federal prose-
cution of computer viruses. Without clear federal jurisdiction, the federal
government is not obliged to prosecute and the hacker might escape state
prosecution if he or she resides in a state other than that in which the
computer crime occurred. The prosecuting state may lack "in personam
jurisdiction," the power to render a judgment over the defendant who is a
resident of another state.' Without sufficient jurisdiction to prosecute
virus crimes that cross state lines, the CFAA can not adequately meet the
challenges of prosecuting computer virus criminals.
The CFAA does not specifically prohibit computer viruses, but can
apply to computer virus by prohibiting unauthorized access to government
or federal interest computers which results in damage or prevents autho-
rized use. The Act has several flaws such as undefined technical terms, a
high standard of culpability, non-existent incentive for virus victims to
report the crime, and inadequate jurisdictional statements. The Act also
limits its protection to government or federal interest computers, and fails
to protect computer systems in the private sector.62 The Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act has flaws, but represents some progress toward effective
computer crime laws.
C. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
In limited circumstances of intercepting electronic communication, the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 can be applied to com-
puter virus crime. The ECPA prohibits unauthorized interception of an
electronic communication. 63 Three of eleven sections within the ECPA
may be used to supplement the CFAA even though the ECPA statute does
not state the term "computer" explicitly."6 The ECPA is applicable to
computer communications in office environments such as electronic mail,
16 Hansen, supra note 7. at 733.
16 Id. at 735.
1" Id.
163 Wilson, supra note 113, at 272-73.
16 Id. at 273.
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electronic bulletin boards, digital textual information, and videotext."
Application of the ECPA to computer communication would prohibit
hackers from improperly accessing users' data transmissions."
In its remedy sections, the ECPA provides fairly substantial civil dam-
ages to a victim.67 The victim may bring a civil action against the sus-
pected hacker and may receive the actual damage or up to $100 a day in
statutory damages to a limit of $100,000." This Act also provides for
punitive damages in appropriate cases, but the statute fails to describe such
cases." In the case of a virus intercepting computer communication, the
ECPA statute would be preferred by the victim because it offers civil
remedies. 70
D. Computer Security Act of 1987
The final component of federal legislation to prohibit computer crime
is the Computer Security Act of 1987. The CSA is an administrative di-
rective designed to improve the security and privacy of sensitive informa-
tion in federal computer systems.' The Act establishes a governmental
focal point, the National Bureau of Standards, for developing security
standards and guidelines for other government agencies. In addition,
the CSA delegated the responsibility for assuring implementation of the
established standards to the National Security Agency and the Department
of Defense. '
The CSA does not have criminal provisions, but does provide for rea-
sonable attorney's fees and contractual remedies in certain automated data
processing disputes.
163 Id.at 273, n.57.
16 18 U.S.C. §2510(14) (1987)
167 18 U.S.C. §2520 (1987).
168 18 U.S.C. §2520 (1987).
"6 18 U.S.C. §2520(b)(2) (1987).
17 Wilson, supra note 113, at 274.
"' 40 U.S.C. §759 (1987).
172 Id.
'7 Wilson, supra note 113, at 275.
17 Id.
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IV. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A. Computer Virus Eradication Act of 1989
In 1989, Congress attempted to further the prevention of computer
viruses by introducing the Computer Virus Eradication Act of 1989
(CVEA) to amend the existing Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The pro-
posed amendment would add three key components to strengthen the ex-
isting statute against computer viruses. First, the CVEA would add a sub-
section to describe proscribed virus conduct.' Second, the proposed Act
would add a penalty for creating and distributing a computer virus to the
already substantial penalties of the CFAA. 76 Third, the CVEA would
create a civil remedy for victims of computer viruses.'"
The CVEA would proscribe two types of computer virus conduct.
First, the Act would prohibit a hacker from inserting a computer virus into
a program or computer that will injure users or others who rely on infor-
mation in the computer.' 8 Second, the Act would prohibit the hacker
from knowingly distributing the computer virus to people who are un-
aware of its existence.'79 By prohibiting these two virus activities, the
federal government could prosecute hackers for most current types of
rogue computer programs: viruses, trojan horses, worms, and bombs.'"
Like its predecessors, the CVEA suffers from vague terms that would be
argued over in court and ruled on by judges who lack the technical experi-
ence to adequately decide the issue. For example, the CVEA uses the
phrase "information or commands" to describe virus-creating conduct.
This phrase has a common meaning, but it might also have a technical
computer meaning that was intended when the bill was created.'8' Many
future prosecutions of hackers who create and distribute viruses could
hinge on a judge's interpretation of the phrase "information or commands"
175 H.R. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at §2(a)(7)(A) (1989).
176 H.R. 55, 101st Cong.. 1st Sess. at §2(b) (1989).
In H.R. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at §2(c) (1989).
178 H.R. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at §2(a)(7)(A) (1989).
179 H.R. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at §2(a)(7)(B) (1989).
ISO Rogue programs would satisfy the "inserts into a program or computer... " language of
the Act. The rogue program instructions are designed to cause harm, which would satisfy the "may
cause loss, expense, or risk to health or welfare... " language of the Act. Hansen, supra note 7, at
740-41.
181 Id. at 737.
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and how it applies to the circumstances of a malicious virus program. This
is only one example of undefined key terms in the CVEA.8 2 To avoid
misinterpretation, the CVEA should include technical computer definitions
for key terms within the Act.
Similar to the CFAA, prosecution under the CVEA would be difficult
because the government must prove the required mental state. Under the
Model Penal Code, a "knowingly" standard is satisfied if the defendant
performs an intentional act knowing in the particular circumstances that
the results of his actions are practically certain to occur.183 CVEA re-
quires prosecutors to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the virus hack-
er knew he created a computer virus and also that he knew or should have
known the virus would cause harm or loss.' This standard will certainly
be an issue during any prosecution of a computer virus hacker because the
hacker losses control over the virus program before it can do harm.'85
One minor connecting word in the CVEA could raise a "loophole"
problem for federal prosecutors. The language of the proposed statute has
an "and" connecting the two prohibited virus offenses." 6 The CVEA
would require the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant inserted a virus into a program or computer, "and" knowingly
distributed the virus to unsuspecting users." 7 Federal prosecutors face an
unjustifiable burden of proving that the suspected hacker both created and
distributed the computer virus.' There are situations where a hacker has
not performed both acts and might go free from prosecution. For example,
a hacker creates a computer virus and accidentally transfers the virus to
another user. This hacker did not knowingly distribute the computer virus
and therefore has not satisfied the second requirement of the Act. Alterna-
tively, a person finds a computer virus and then intentionally distributes
the virus to others who are unaware of the danger. This offender could
also go free because he did not satisfy the first requirement of creating the
computer virus. Prior to adoption of any statute like the CVEA, the legis-
132 Id.
3 Id. at 739 (citing Model Penal Code § 2. 02 General Requirements on Culpability (Official
Draft 1985).
184 H.R. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at §2(a) (1989).
195 Hansen, supra note 7, at 740.
196 H.R. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
187 Tramontana. supra note 21, at 272.
In Id.
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lation should be redrafted to close this type of loophole, as it could threat-
en the future enforcement of computer crime laws.
The CVEA would provide as substantial a penalty for creating and
distributing a computer virus as it would for knowingly gaining unautho-
rized access to information that is restricted for national security by Ex-
ecutive Order.'89 The penalty is a fine, up to ten years imprisonment, or
both if it is the hacker's first offense under the CFAA or the CVEA. If the
hacker had been previously convicted under the CFAA or the CVEA, the
penalty is a fine, up to twenty years imprisonment, or both."9 The sub-
stantial penalties would be properly within the federal scheme of penalties
and would arm the government with a new weapon against computer vi-
ruses.191
The CVEA was an important step by Congress to improve federal
computer crime legislation. This Act would have created an incentive for
virus victims to report the infections by providing for civil remedies that
include appropriate relief, reasonable attorney's fees, and other litigation
expenses.'92 With the possibility of recovering damages, more victims of
computer viruses might choose to pursue actions against hackers and re-
port virus infections.'93 If more companies would report virus infections,
more virus hackers would be prosecuted. A trend of successful virus pros-
ecutions would reduce the number of hackers willing to risk federal prose-
cution by creating and distributing computer viruses.
The CVEA would have provided the federal government with broad
jurisdiction over computer viruses under the U.S. Constitution's Com-
merce Clause." This broad federal jurisdiction could be invoked when-
ever a virus affected interstate or foreign commerce, or was furthered by
means of interstate or foreign commerce. 95 Conversely, the CFAA only
references interstate transactions when passwords are trafficked across
state lines."% The broader jurisdiction would increase the threat of feder-
19 18 U.S.C. §1030(c)(2) (1990). See also H.R. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at §2(b) (1989).
190 18 U.S.C. §1030(c)(2) (1990). See also H.R. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at §2(b) (1989).
191 Hansen, supra note 7, at 744.
.192 H.R. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at §2(c) (1989).
193 Hansen, supra note 7, at 745.
19 H.R. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at §2(a) (1989); See also U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
1 H.R. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at §2(a) (1989).
1% It proscribes rogue programs "if inserting or providing such information or commands ef-
fects or is effected or furthered by means of interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(6)(A)
(1990).
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al prosecution and therefore, reduce the number of hackers creating and
distributing malicious computer viruses.
The most recent version of the CVEA was introduced with thirty-two
sponsors in January of 1989. The House Judiciary Committee reviewed
the CVEA, and the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice conducted hearings
in late 1989. Surprisingly, after widespread bipartisan support for the
CVEA, it was not enacted.
B. Computer Protection Act of 1989
In 1989, the Computer Protection Act was also introduced to the
House of Representatives. This proposed bill would prohibit any person
from willfully or knowingly "sabotaging" a computer system, hardware or
software.'97 The bill would allow virus victims to receive appropriate
compensatory damages in a civil action against the hacker.'98 Civil reme-
dies would provide a desired incentive for victims to report computer virus
infections. '"
However, the bill failed to further define the key term "sabotage.""
"Sabotage" could include the creation and distribution of computer viruses,
but without a definition in the proposed statute, it is too difficult to deter-
mine what conduct is proscribed."' The Computer Protection Act suf-
fered the same fate as the Computer Virus Eradication Act of 1989 and
was not enacted.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress should reintroduce and enact a corrected version of the Com-
puter Virus Eradication Act. Rogue programs evolved rapidly from theo-
ries to games, and finally to varieties of malicious programs that cause
electronic terrorism. Federal statutes should continue to change and prog-
ress toward effective protection of computer systems to keep pace with
developments in computer technology and computer abuse. Each adopted
computer crime Act has been an improvement from the prior computer
197 H.R. 287, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. at §1368(a) (1989).
In H.R. 287, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at §1368(b) (1989).
19 Branscomb, supra note 1, at 49.
2W Tramontana, supra note 21, at 275.
2D' Id.
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crime law. Congress should correct the flaws in the proposed legislation
such as undefined key terms, difficult standards of culpability, vague statu-
tory language, and ineffective incentives for victims to report computer




COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE AcT OF 1986
§ 1030. Fraud and related activity in connection with computers
(a) Whoever-
(1) knowingly accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds au-
thorized access, and by means of such conduct obtains information that
has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Ex-
ecutive order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclo-
sure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or any restricted
data, as defined in paragraph y of section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, with the intent or reason to believe that such information so ob-
tained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage
of any foreign nation;
(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds au-
thorized access, and thereby obtains information contained in a financial
record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer as defined in section
1602(n) of title 15, or contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency
on a consumer, as such terms are defined in the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.);
(3) intentionally, without authorization to access any computer of a depart-
ment or agency of the United States, accesses such a computer of that de-
partment or agency that is exclusively for the use of the Government of
the United States or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such
use, is used by or for the Government of the United States and such con-
duct affects the use of the Government's operation of such computer;
(4) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a Federal interest com-
puter without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of
such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value,
unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the
use of the computer;
(5) intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer without authoriza-
tion, and by means of one or more instances of such conduct alters, dam-
ages, or destroys information in any such Federal interest computer, or
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prevents authorized use of any such computer or information, and there-
by-
(A) causes loss to one or more others of a value aggregating $1,000 or
more during any one year period; or
(B) modifies or impairs, or potentially modifies or impairs, the medical
examination, medical diagnosis, medical treatment, or medical care of one
or more individuals; or
(6) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics (as defined in section
1029) in any password or similar information through which a computer
may be accessed without authorization, if-
(A) such trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce; or
(B) such computer is used by or for the Government of the United States;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.
(b) Whoever attempts to commit an offense under subsection (a) of this
section shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.
(c) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) or (b) of this sec-
tion is-
(1) (A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years,
or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section
which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under such
subsection, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this sub-
paragraph; and
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than twenty years,
or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section
which occurs after a conviction for another offense under such subsection,
or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph;
and
(2) (A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than one year,
or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(2), (a)(3) or (a)(6)
of this section which does not occur after a conviction for another offense
under such subsection, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable un-
der this subparagraph; and
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or
both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(2), (a)(3) or (a)(6) of
this section which occurs after a conviction for another offense under such
subsection, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this sub-
paragraph; and
(3) (A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than five
years, or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(4) or (a)(5)
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
of this section which does not occur after a conviction for another offense
under such subsection, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable un-
der this subparagraph; and
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years,
or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(4) or (a)(5) of this
section which occurs after a conviction for another offense under such
subsection, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this sub-
paragraph.
(d) The United States Secret Service shall, in addition to any other agency
having such authority, have the authority to investigate offenses under this
section. Such authority of the United States Secret Service shall be exer-
cised in accordance with an agreement which shall be entered into by the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General.
(e) As used in this section-
(1) the term "computer" means an electronic, magnetic, optical, electro-
chemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical,
arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or
communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with
such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or
typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device;
(2) the term "Federal interest computer" means a computer-
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States
Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use,
used by or for a financial institution or the United States Government and
the conduct constituting the offense affects the use of the financial
institution's operation or the Government's operation of such computer; or
(B) which is one of two ,or more computers used in committing the of-
fense, not all of which are located in the same State;
(3) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and any other commonwealth, possession or territory of
the United States;
(4) the term "financial institution" means-
(A) an institution with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation;
(B) the Federal Reserve or a member of the Federal Reserve including any
Federal Reserve Bank;
(C) a credit union with accounts insured by the National Credit Union Ad-
ministration;
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(D) a member of the Federal home loan bank system and any home loan
bank;
(E) any institution of the Farm Credit System under the Farm Credit Act
of 1971;
(F) a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion pursuant to section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
(G) the Securities Investor Protection Corporation;
(H) a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as such terms are defined in
paragraphs (1) and (3) of section l(b) of the International Banking Act of
1978); and
(I) an organization operating under section 25 or section 25(a) of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act.
(5) the term "financial record" means information derived from any record
held by a financial institution pertaining to a customer's relationship with
the financial institution;
(6) the term "exceeds authorized access" means to access a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter; and
(7) the term "department of the United States" means the legislative or
judicial branch of the Government or one of the executive departments
enumerated in section 101 of title 5.
(f) This section does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative,
protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the
United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, or of an intelli-





To amend section 1030 of title 18, United States Code, to provide penal-
ties for persons interfering with the operations of computers through the
use of programs containing hidden commands that can cause harm, and
for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
January 3, 1989
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Mr. Herger (for himself, Mr. Carr, Mr. Frank, Mr. McCurdy, Mr. Hyde,
Mr. Spence, Mr. Donald E. Luckens, Mr. Lewis of Georgia, Mr. Emerson,
Mr. Lagomarsino, Mr. Dannemeyer, Mr. Rinaldo, Mrs. Meyers of Kansas,
Mr. Sawyer, Mr. Marinez, Mr. Stark, Mr. Holloway, Mr. Hansen, Mr.
Inhofe, Mr. Houghton, Mr. Frost, Mr. Sikorski, Mr. Foglietta, Mrs. Boxer,
Mr. Whittaker, Mr. Owens of New York, Mr. DeFazio, Mr. Boehlert, Mr.
Moorhead, Mr. Mfume, Mr. Shaw, Mr. Neal of North Carolina, and Mr.
Gunderson) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary.
A BILL
To amend section 1030 of title 18, United States Code, to provide penal-
ties for person interfering with the operations of computers through the
use of programs containing hidden commands that can cause harm, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Unit-
ed States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Computer Virus Eradication Act of
1989".
SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS
(a) PROHIBITION.-Section 1030(a) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended-
(1) in paragraph (5), by striking "or" after "individuals;";
(2) in paragraph (6), by inserting "or" after "United States;"; and
(3) by adding after paragraph (6) the following new paragraph:
"(7) knowingly-
"(A) inserts into a program for a computer, or a computer itself, informa-
tion or commands, knowing or having reason to believe that such informa-
tion or commands may cause loss, expense, or risk to health or welfare-
"(i) to users of such computer or a computer on which such program is
run, or to persons who rely on information processed on such computer;or
"(ii) to users of any other computer or to persons who rely on information
processed on any other computer; and
"(B) provides (with knowledge of the existence of such information or
commands) such program or such computer to a person in circumstances
in which such person does not know of the insertions or its effects; if in-
serting or providing such information or commands affects, or is effected
or furthered by means of, interstate or foreign commerce;".
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(b) PENALTY FOR A VIOLATION.-Section 1030(c)(1) of such title is
amended by inserting "or (a)(7)" after "(a)(1)" each place it appears.
(c) CIVIL REMEDY.-Section 1030 of such title is amended-
(1) by redesignating subsections (d), (e), and (f) as subsections (e), (f), and
(g), respectively; and
(2) by adding after subsection (c) the following new subsection:
"(d) Whoever suffers loss by reason of a violation of subsection (a)(7)
may, in a civil action against the violator, obtain appropriate relief. In a
civil action under this subsection, the court may award to a prevailing par-
ty a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation expenses."
